Apparently, the events that took place between Iran and Russia in July 2023 may help us understand the relationship between the two countries better. Passions around a seemingly trivial technical issue, which resulted in diplomatic tension between Tehran and Moscow, clearly indicate how fragile the existing ties between the two countries are. Incidentally, there is a substantial group of people in both Iran and Russia who think the same way.

Moscow's technical mistake or a deliberate move?

The incident happened right after the sixth round of the strategic dialogue Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held on July 10, 2023 in Moscow, when a paragraph on the three disputed islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa was included in the final declaration of the summit at the request of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is known to have territorial claims to these islands and has proposed to resolve the problem within the framework of international law. However, the said paragraph, as well as its Arabic version, in which the Persian Gulf is referred to as the "Gulf of Basra", caused serious resentment in Iran.

Iran considers these islands to be its sovereign territory, and challenging the rights to them in any declaration to be a disrespect for its territorial integrity. Immediately after the Moscow Declaration was made public, the Russian ambassador in Tehran, Alexei Dedov, was invited to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where he was asked to explain the situation and reminded that the islands belonged to the Islamic Republic of Iran. But the discontent was not the first and only case in the history of Russian-Iranian relations.

The three island problem

These islands are located in the Persian Gulf, close to the strategically important, now Iranian seaport of Bandar Abbas at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. They were seized by Britain in 1903, after which the Emirate of Sharjah (UAE) began building a seaport on the islands. Despite Iran's protests, the British continued to establish their authority over the islands. In 1949, Iran applied to the UN and managed to lay territorial claims to the islands. However, instead of Iran, Britain gave the disputed islands to the UAE, recognising the Emirates' independence in 1971. Just a few days before, Iran and the Emirate of Sharjah signed an agreement on the disputed islands. According to the agreement, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb were to go to Iran, while Abu Musa and the profits from the island were to be divided between the two countries. However, right after the UAE gained independence, Iran seized all three islands, declaring them its territory. Britain did not object. But in the following years, the increased strategic importance of the islands and their location in a rich oil and gas region intensified the struggle for these lands. The UAE declared Iran's seizure of the islands illegal and launched an international lawsuit. Iran recognises the islands as its historical territory and opposes any discussion on the issue.

The incident causes anger among Iranian officials

A similar paragraph on the three islands was also included in the final declaration of the GCC summit held last December. This raised serious objections in Iran, especially since the event was attended by the Chinese president Xi Jinping. But Beijing managed to hush up the scandal thanks to diplomatic and political channels of communication with the Iranian leadership, as well as its deputy prime minister dispatched to Iran right after the incident. Interestingly though Tehran's reaction to the position of Russian authorities on the islands was tougher.

After the official statement of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, a number of Iranian government officials, politicians, experts and military officers condemned Russia's actions, declaring Moscow's disrespect for the country's territorial integrity. Discussions even reached the country's supreme legislative body, where the speaker of Iranian parliament Mohammad Baghir Ghalibaf sharply criticised Russia's position on the islands.

"Russia is our neighbour, and it should have known that the path of cooperation goes through respecting the red lines of the Iranian people, including the territorial integrity and continuity of Iran's sovereignty over the islands," Ghalibaf said.

It is not hard to guess the degree of irritation in Iran, given that Ghalibaf is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general who favours the cooperation with Russia.

Vahid Jalalzadeh, chairman of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, stated on Twitter that "Moscow's inadequate stance towards Iran does not contribute to partnership between the two countries."

International expert Mehdi Mutaharnia believes that after the political isolation caused by the war in Ukraine and the Wagner crisis, President Putin has lost his former influence. Allegedly, Russia is trying to secure the support of Arab countries by sacrificing Tehran in order to get out of the isolation. "How else can you explain this position?" he asks in his interview with local media.

According to Hamid Abutalebi, a political adviser to Iran's former president, Tehran 'lost' the 2015 nuclear talks because of Russia, 'fell into a trap' during the war in Ukraine and agreed to the Russians' request to teach them how to avoid sanctions. Yet, Iran signed a document threatening its national sovereignty. As we can see, the discussion of the status of the islands has reached a critical point - a full-scale revision of Iranian-Russian ties.

Distrust of Russian arms supplies

Another reason that worsened the Moscow-Tehran was Russia's failure to fulfil a state order to transfer Russian Su-35 fighter jets to Iran. In fact, the agreement between Iran and Russia was reached back in 2021. Reportedly, Russia decided to sell 24 aircraft to Iran after Egypt rejected them. And after Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, Iran seemed increasingly willing to buy a large amount of Russian arms and equipment in return for a large volume of drones and missiles from Iran. There were reports of transferring Su-35s to Iran earlier this year, when a video was published showing the aircraft parked at the Tehran airport. However, Tehran later denied the fact. Chief of the Iranian Air Force, Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, said in his interview with the state television that the Russian fighter jets had not yet been delivered.

To a certain extent, the delayed delivery of Russian fighter jets supposed to arrive in Iran as early as March this year is understandable. After all, Russia needs them more now, given the current situation in Ukraine. However, Iran believes that the Russian leadership is deliberately delaying the delivery of fighter jets, allegedly in collusion with the West and Israel. Tehran still cannot forgive Moscow for refusing to sell it the surface-to-air missile systems S-300.

After all, an agreement between Moscow and Tehran on the purchase of five S-300 batteries worth $800m was signed back in 2007. However, in 2009, the Russian leadership refused to supply the weapons, citing the sanctions imposed on Iran. It later announced that the C-300s would be transferred to Iran only after the signing of the nuclear agreement.

In 2019, Iran tried to buy S-400 HHM SAMs from Russia. Despite a visit to Moscow by then Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, it later turned out that the Russian president did not authorise the sale of S-400s to Iran.

Other reasons why Tehran is dissatisfied with Moscow include Russia's failure to openly cooperate with Iran in Syria, its repeated disregard for Iranian interests, and leaving Iran alone, albeit indirectly, to engage in politics in the South Caucasus. In July, Ali Akbar Vilayati, an adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader and former foreign minister, published a lengthy article calling on Russia to act to prevent "foreign forces" from invading the South Caucasus.

And now, amid the obvious rapprochement between the two countries after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia's refusal to provide military aircraft to Iran has increased Tehran's irritation and resentment towards Moscow. Along with the Iranian reformist politicians traditionally considered to be supportive of pro-Western sentiments in the Iranian political elite, its military wing, especially the representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah) who support rapprochement with Russia, also expresses indignation at the ongoing situation. For example, the incumbent foreign minister of Iran, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who is also a former Sepah officer and a member of the conservative wing of Iranian politicians, has made a series of harsh statements against Russia over the disputed islands—the move so unexpected from a member of the traditional Iranian political elite.

Interestingly, Abdollahian's predecessor, Javad Zarif (a prominent representative of reformists), published a series of articles on Iran's strategic choice between the West and Russia. It shows that serious discussions are ongoing in the Iranian political elite on this issue. In a nutshell, Zarif's statements mean that Tehran should follow a pragmatic foreign policy line built on Iran's national interests. In other words, instead of a strategic choice between the West or Russia, Zarif proposes the concept of a variable policy based on satisfying Iran's tactical interests.

Also, perhaps the reason for Tehran's harsh attacks on Moscow was not so much the Russians' mistake about the disputed islands or their negligence in selling weapons to Iran, but rather the ongoing semi-secret negotiations on the nuclear deal, which gradually become a subject of favourable sentiments among the Iranians. Even the Supreme Leader of Iran announced his agreement to continue the talks provided that they do not infringe the interests of Iran.

Apparently, the number of Iranians sharing Javad Zarif's position on the non-linearity of Iran's foreign policy and the importance to keep it flexible enough to keep pace with the country's current state interests is also growing. On the other hand, it is impossible to deny the deepening of relations between Iran and Russia, especially in recent years. There is a fairly serious group of conservatives in Iran who advocate the co-operation with Russia. Therefore, the recent events can be described as a test for the two countries than a turning point. They demonstrate that not all Iranians like Russia and that relations with Moscow are not built on a solid basis.