Ironically, the new year in the Middle East, as has been the case for over two millennia, has once again been marked by events that could have decisive implications for the region. In Iran and the regions under its control, which Tehran officially refers to as the "axis of resistance", three terrorist attacks have escalated tensions. Evidently, they all shared a common objective. But more on that later...

On January 2, a drone strike in one of Beirut's neighbourhoods, Dahiya, known as a "Hezbollah stronghold", resulted in the death of Saleh al-Arouri, deputy chairman of the Hamas Politburo. While many signs point to Israel as the orchestrator of the action, official Tel Aviv has not claimed responsibility, even after some Israeli officials publicly admitted to it.

A day after al-Arouri's assassination, another terrorist attack occurred in the centre of Kerman province in eastern Iran. The attack took place at an event commemorating the death anniversary of General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Brigade of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), who was eliminated four years ago by the Americans. The attack resulted in 84 deaths and 284 injuries. Israel was named as the perpetrator. However, two days later, ISIS issued a statement claiming responsibility.

Then, on January 4, a US Armed Forces strike on the headquarters of the pro-Iranian Shiite militia Al-Nujaba in Baghdad killed Abu Taqwa al-Saidi (real name Mushtaq Talib al-Saidi), commander of the movement's 12th Brigade and deputy chief of the local operational headquarters. Abu Taqwa was also the group's main actor in terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria, and commander of its "missile division." Al-Nujaba is considered one of the armed groups close to Iran. Since the attack on Israel on October 7, armed groups in Iraq and Syria have carried out more than 115 missile and drone strikes on US military bases stationed in these countries. These figures were valid at the time of writing this article.

Although all three attacks were carried out in different countries and by different individuals, their common target was directly Iran or forces allied to Tehran in the region. Most importantly, all three events serve the process of drawing Tehran into the war in the Middle East.

Against the backdrop of escalating tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border, the attack on al-Arouri in Beirut can be seen as a serious provocation, with the instigators likely hoping to incite Hezbollah to attack Israel. After all, al-Arouri was killed in a Hezbollah-controlled area.

The terrorist attack in Baghdad was ordered by the United States - the Pentagon itself confirmed the elimination of the leader of Al-Nujaba. Interestingly, Washington tolerated attacks on its military bases in Iraq and Syria for three months before punishing the Iraqi armed groups on January 4, 2024. It's likely that Washington is well aware (or expects) that these events could prompt Tehran and its allies to retaliate against the US.

Finally, there was a terrorist attack in Kerman, Iran. The choice of this particular province has symbolic significance. Qassem Suleimani was killed by the US military in the Iraqi capital. Iran considered this man to be the main figure of resistance to the US and its allies in the Middle East, a leading fighter against ISIS. The calculation was made that choosing the day of his death as the date of the terrorist attack would prompt Tehran to seek revenge.

But for now, Tehran is exercising caution. Contrary to expectations, the Iranian authorities have reacted with restraint. Despite accusations against Israel from a number of government officials and members of parliament demanding a decisive response, the Iranian leadership limited itself to a statement ruling out the possibility of starting a war. However, it is clear that the Iranians are aware of the perpetrator of the crime and will seek revenge.

Challenged by Gaza

Despite Tehran's official denial of involvement in the October 7 Hamas action, it is perceived as a significant player in the ensuing tensions. In addition to providing political, military, and financial support to Hamas, Iran is openly anti-Israeli. Tehran's subordinate forces, spread across the Middle East, have begun to act against the U.S. and Israel in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and along the Red Sea coast in Yemen.

Tehran's activities pose serious problems not only for Washington and Tel Aviv but also for several countries in the region. This is becoming increasingly evident against the backdrop of the Arab-Iranian reconciliation that began last year. Iran's call for Muslim countries to take stronger measures against Israel at the November meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah, armed attacks on US military bases in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis' attempt to restrict ship movements in the Red Sea threaten the interests of countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE. In particular, recent Houthi attacks on naval vessels have dealt a significant blow to Egypt, a large portion of whose economy is fuelled by revenues from the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seriously concerned about the Houthi missile and drone strikes on Israeli territory, given their long history of military action against their compatriots in Yemen.

The events following the war in Gaza demonstrate Iran's growing military power in the Middle East through its proxies on the ground. This power can be a headache for countries in the region, especially on sensitive issues such as the Palestinian conflict. In contrast to passive calls for a truce and condemnatory statements from Arab countries, attacks by Iranian-backed forces against the US and Israel are attracting more attention and popular sympathy. Against this backdrop, the Arab authorities, which have been in league with Israel and are one step away from reconciliation with it, appear almost like adversaries. In this sense, Tehran's stance also poses a threat to the US and Israeli attempts to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.

Will Iran engage in a major war?

As already mentioned, the common feature of all three incidents that took place at the beginning of the year was that they were aimed at pushing Iran into a major war. The expectation seems to have been that Tehran itself or its partners (read: Hezbollah) would respond to at least one of them and that this would lead to a significant upheaval in the region. It appears that some forces are eager to drag Tehran into a war with the US and Israel. But it is also clear that Tehran's leadership is keen to avoid such an outcome.

It should be noted that a war with Iran is in Israel's interest. A new hotbed of war would divert attention from Gaza and, most importantly, eliminate its main rival, Iran. This is primarily the case.

Secondly, the same war could lead to Tehran's isolation in the region, leaving it alone before Israel and the US-NATO coalition. Tehran is well aware that not only the Jewish state is interested in its defeat.

Given these factors, Iran is trying to act cautiously and not give the U.S.-Israeli tandem a chance for a major war. Even now, Hezbollah's confrontation with Israel is not in the interests of either Tehran or the organization itself. Lebanon's political forces do not want a large-scale war with Israel and have repeatedly warned Hezbollah's leadership against it. However, the situation will change if Israel is the first attacker. If Lebanon becomes Tel Aviv's target, Hezbollah will strengthen its position both at home and abroad. Its capacity to resist will expand, and Israel will face further criticism as the aggressor. Moreover, given Hezbollah's limited military capabilities, an attack on Israel would not guarantee victory.

This is why neither the US and Israel, nor Iran and its allies are escalating the situation. All parties are waiting for the first move to be made by the other side.

Risk to Arab countries

The continuation of the current state of affairs poses risks for the Arab countries in the region. Amid the ongoing relentless war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the Arab countries, unable to influence the American-Israeli alliance, are also facing pressure from their local public. The people of these countries, for whom the question of Palestine is almost a matter of life and death, are demanding decisive steps from their authorities, exerting increasing pressure on their own governments.

On the other hand, the ongoing attacks by Iran and its proxy-allies on US and Israeli positions, as well as Tehran's calls for stringent measures, further complicate the situation for the Arab leadership. The appeals of Arab pan-Islamists and sectarian fanatics, which were popular during peacetime, are also losing their significance. In other words, war also threatens the system of relations.

In this sense, the events taking place in the Middle East after October 7, 2023 have triggered another remapping of the region. The war in Gaza will help to clarify the details of this redivision.