Precisely a decade ago, in September 2014, the Houthis, members of the armed group Ansarullah, who had previously been largely unknown to the international community for their militant behaviour, took control of Yemen. Even the military intervention by a hastily assembled Arab coalition aimed at quelling the fervour of their tribesmen and defeating the group, which had then assumed control of the capital of the war-torn nation, Sana'a, proved ineffective. Today, the Houthis obstruct the passage of Israeli and Western vessels in the Red Sea, challenge the United States and its allies, and occasionally launch missile strikes against Israel.

On September 15, they once again captured global attention when their rockets reached central Israel for the first time. The Houthis' ability to produce rockets capable of travelling 2,000 kilometers while evading the vigilant radar systems of American, European, and Israeli forces may seem implausible. Yet, it is a fact. In July, their missiles and drones targeted the Israeli port city of Eilat.

A significant shift occurred in Yemen's historical narrative in January this year when the US and the EU deployed naval forces to the Red Sea, thus forming an international coalition against the Houthis. Alongside the Israeli Air Force, this coalition conducted several bombing raids on Houthi military units, including those situated in Sana'a and the key port city of Hodeidah; however, these attacks yielded little success.

At the same time, threats from the Houthis are intensifying—the unwavering "helpers of Allah" (Arabic: Ansarullah) are now striking at Israel's internal territories, shelling and igniting vessels bound for Israel and its allies, including those belonging to the US Navy.

Masters of the Red Sea

By the end of October 2023, the Houthis announced that in response to the assault on Gaza, they would prevent any Israeli-related cargo ships from passing through until the conclusion of hostilities and would not allow them access to the Red Sea. This has generally been implemented. Since that declaration, 83 vessels have been attacked or hijacked in the Red Sea, with 56 belonging to the EU and approximately 40 percent associated with Greece.

Consequently, ship traffic through the Red Sea has almost halved. Prior to November 2023's active Houthi intervention, an average of 368 ships traversed these waters daily; now that figure has diminished to just over 200. Most of these vessels must now navigate around the Cape of Good Hope, extending journey times from 25 to 34 days and quadrupling shipping costs ($5,182 per container compared to $1,289 in 2023). Specifically, vessels transporting compressed gas and cars are prohibited from entering the Red Sea.

Economically speaking, Egypt has suffered significantly—the Red Sea and Suez Canal previously facilitated 15 percent of global merchant shipping traffic, contributing $10 billion annually to the Egyptian treasury. Currently, Egypt's revenue from the Suez Canal has been cut in half.

In contrast to Israeli, American, and European vessels, Turkish, Russian, and Chinese ships encounter no difficulties in the Red Sea.

Experts attribute Egypt's silence on this matter to several factors. Firstly, it can partially compensate for its Suez Canal revenue losses through closer ties with BRICS nations. The second factor is political; the Houthis have claimed their blockade of the Red Sea is an act of solidarity with Palestinians regarding ships delivering cargo to Israel. Consequently, any action taken by Egypt against the Houthis would be viewed as a stance against Palestine. This is why official Cairo refrains from confrontation with them.

Finally, a third factor concerns the controversial IMEC project—a transport corridor from India to Europe initiated by the United States. An agreement regarding the corridor was reached between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel shortly before Hamas's attack on Israel. This corridor was intended as an alternative route and poses a threat to Egypt's strategic interests in the Suez Canal.

Fearing backlash from Arab public opinion, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also chose not to join the US coalition against the Houthis, further benefiting their position.

Houthis: Israel's Headache

The September strike by the Houthis deep into Israeli territory using a hypersonic missile generated significant concern due to its range (2,000 kilometers), speed of impact (11 minutes), and coalition forces' inability to intercept it with their radar systems in the Red Sea.

This incident can rightly be interpreted as an indication that the conflict in Gaza is transitioning into a new regional phase. Furthermore, it highlights that the Houthis likely enjoy substantial military and technical support from external sources. It is improbable that they could produce such advanced weaponry under sanctions and a de facto naval blockade that has persisted for over a decade. Additionally, it appears they have benefactors in the Middle East beyond Iran, given Yemen's strategic location with access to both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

The acquisition of missiles by the Houthis—who seem unaffected by international embargoes and boldly defy world powers like the US and NATO—signals a new chapter in the Middle East conflict.

The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, which could potentially expand into Lebanon and the West Bank, raises concerns about a broader regional conflict. The course of this war could be influenced by both missile attacks from the Houthis and their deployment of fighters into combat zones. The recent rocket and drone strike on Tel Aviv in July—resulting in one death and ten injuries—illustrates that the Houthis possess weaponry that poses serious threats to Israel. Yemeni army spokesman General Yahya Sari echoed these same sentiments.

Moreover, should Yemen enter this conflict as an active participant—especially given its support for Palestine—it could galvanise and expand anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the Arab world.

As previously mentioned, attacks by the Houthis on Israel confer legitimacy upon them. This compels Arab nations to acknowledge their political significance. Such developments already suggest a shift in the political landscape of the Middle East.

Additionally, one must consider the considerable economic damage inflicted by the Houthis on Israel and its allies in the Red Sea during this Palestinian-Israeli war.

Given recent statements from leaders within Ansarullah, one can argue that overall, the Houthis associate lifting their blockade in the Red Sea with developments in Palestine—leading to emerging political and military realities in the Middle East. The ramifications of these developments will become increasingly evident in the near future.